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DUP DISCOURSES ON VIOLENCE 
AND THEIR IMPACT ON THE NORTHERN IRELAND PEACE 
PROCESS 
 
Amber Rankin and Gladys Ganiel 
 
Abstract 
 
This paper analyses the Democratic Unionist Party‟s (DUP) discourses 
about paramilitary violence in Northern Ireland. Drawing on narrative 
analysis of DUP discourses reported in Northern Ireland‟s largest unionist 
newspaper, the News Letter (1998–2006), it explores the relationship 
between the party‟s identity, its discourses about republican and loyalist 
paramilitaries, and the impact of these words on the DUP‟s electoral success 
and on the peace process. The paper argues that these discourses may haunt 
the progress of peace-building, not least because the DUP will find it hard to 
disentangle itself from a history of scepticism and nay-saying even as it takes 
a leading role in a devolved Executive designed by an Agreement it long-
scorned. 
 
 
Introduction 
 
The Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) and its founder, the Rev. Ian 
Paisley, have been controversial throughout Northern Ireland‟s Troubles and 
its current post-conflict transition.
1
 In 1971 Paisley, then a young firebrand 
evangelical preacher, founded the party with substantial support from 
members of the Free Presbyterian Church, which he also had founded. 
Paisley, his party, and his church were often regarded as prophets of war, not 
of peace. In particular, the DUP had an ambiguous relationship with 
violence. Around the time of the DUP‟s founding, Paisley and other 
members of the party were accused of shadowy dealings with loyalist 
paramilitaries. Although Paisley and the party publicly disassociated 
themselves from loyalist paramilitaries, suspicions about their true 
involvement remained. Further, Paisley‟s fiery rhetoric was regarded as 
inciting paramilitaries to violence. The story of an imprisoned loyalist 
paramilitary bemoaning the day that he ever listened to “that man Paisley” 
has become apocryphal.  
Paisley was once regarded as the politician who would always say “no” 
to compromise with Irish republicanism, particularly in the guise of Sinn 
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Féin. That has made the DUP‟s decision to share power with Sinn Féin in the 
Northern Ireland Executive all the more stunning. Images of First Minister 
Paisley laughing and joking with Deputy First Minister Martin McGuinness 
of Sinn Féin (who has admitted that he belonged to the Irish Republican 
Army (IRA)) are amongst the most surprising and iconic of the recent 
transitional period. 
Throughout the Troubles the DUP was the “second” party of unionism, 
trailing the long-established Ulster Unionist Party (UUP) at the ballot box 
and in terms of respectability. It was the UUP that claimed to speak for 
“mainstream” unionism, whilst the DUP was said to appeal to the fringes. 
The DUP‟s constituencies were the unlikely bedfellows of rural-dwelling 
evangelical Protestants and urban, working class loyalists – including, it was 
assumed, those who were involved in paramilitarism. It was the UUP that 
negotiated the 1998 Belfast Agreement, while the DUP walked out of the 
talks. The then leader of the UUP, David Trimble, was honoured with a 
Nobel Prize for his work at the negotiations, but at home in Northern Ireland 
Trimble and the UUP struggled to implement the Agreement. This was due 
in large part to the DUP, which effectively tapped in to unionist disaffection 
with the terms of the Agreement and the UUP‟s inability to convince Sinn 
Féin to deliver on IRA decommissioning. During most of this time the 
Northern Ireland Assembly was suspended and the region was ruled directly 
from Westminster. DUP discourses about violence were prominent 
throughout this transitional period, when it overtook the UUP as the leading 
unionist party in terms of electoral success and respectability. Indeed, the 
DUP now confidently describes itself as the mainstream unionist party and 
its current leader, Peter Robinson, has made overtures to the UUP about 
forming some sort of united unionist party or movement.  
This means that the way the DUP has talked and continues to talk about 
violence is significant. The party‟s discourses about violence can be placed 
into two broad categories: denouncing and denying. On the one hand, the 
DUP denounce republican paramilitaries for initiating and perpetuating the 
armed struggle, which the DUP regards as illegitimate. This includes a 
consistent linking of Sinn Féin with the IRA. Prior to the restoration of the 
Northern Ireland Assembly in May 2007, it included the claim that unionists 
should not share power with Sinn Féin until the IRA had decommissioned. 
Without IRA decommissioning, Sinn Féin would remain “unreconstructed 
terrorists.” On the other hand, the DUP denounced loyalist paramilitaries for 
taking up arms, whilst at the same time denying that their party or their 
party‟s rhetoric had any impact upon loyalist paramilitaries. Loyalist 
paramilitaries often were reduced to criminals or thugs. 
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What meaning do these discourses have in what is once again being 
hailed as a “new Northern Ireland,” where Paisley shared tea and a power-
sharing executive with McGuinness? This paper argues that there are direct 
relationships between the DUP discourses about violence and the party‟s 
identity, its electoral success, and the outworking of the peace process. 
Drawing on narrative analysis of DUP discourses recorded in Northern 
Ireland‟s largest unionist newspaper, the News Letter (1998-2006), it 
explores those relationships. The first part of this paper outlines how we 
gathered, categorised and analysed DUP discourses about violence, including 
the relationship of those discourses to the party‟s identity and its electoral 
success. Here, we argue that the DUP‟s use of discourses denouncing 
republican violence has allowed it to retain its identity as the “true” loyalist 
party, and the most able defender of the union with Great Britain. This was 
important in a context in which it appeared that the UUP was impotent to 
lead unionists and protect their interests. When the DUP gradually began to 
moderate some of its policies on power-sharing, those discourses worked as 
a “smokescreen” or a cover as it took previously undreamed of positions. 
The DUP could be said to have adopted the UUP‟s positions and its policies, 
but it was able to present itself as uncompromising on its core principles.  
In the second part of the paper, we consider how these discourses may 
continue to impact on Northern Ireland‟s political transition. It is not clear 
how the DUP‟s historic condemnation of Sinn Féin and the illegitimacy of 
the IRA‟s armed struggle will affect their relationships in the power-sharing 
executive – and thus their ability to govern Northern Ireland effectively. 
Paisley and McGuinness developed what appeared to be a warm and 
effective working relationship, surprising almost everyone. It is not clear 
what sort of relationship McGuinness will have with Paisley‟s successor as 
First Minister, Robinson. It will take time for trust to develop between the 
parties. It also is not clear if the DUP has developed effective, new 
discourses to explain its participation in the Executive to its erstwhile 
followers. With the DUP sniping at its heels, the UUP failed in this regard. 
The DUP now has a hardline (if smaller) rival, Traditional Unionist Voice 
(TUV), sniping at its heels. Also, it is possible that discourses that 
disassociate the DUP from loyalist paramilitarism may absolve their party – 
and the wider unionist community – from recognising and addressing their 
own ambiguous attitudes about violence. In such a situation, the challenges 
of integrating former loyalist paramilitaries in society may not be adequately 
addressed. The DUP‟s discourses about violence may continue to haunt the 
party as it attempts to participate in a transition to peace.  
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Analysing DUP Discourses 
 
This analysis is part of a wider project on the DUP, which includes 
considering its public discourses and the presentation of the party in the 
public sphere. There are a number of sources that could be used for this 
analysis, including party statements, press releases, policy documents, the 
party‟s email and text messaging services, and so on. However, we were 
interested in not merely how the DUP wishes to present itself (which would 
presumably be reflected in its own materials), but in how the party is 
presented in the media. An analysis of all media outlets would have been 
beyond the scope of this project, so we chose to focus on the presentation of 
the party in Northern Ireland‟s largest unionist newspaper, the News Letter. 
This can be justified on the following grounds. First, newspaper reports 
generally reproduce longer and more substantial quotations from politicians 
and more in-depth analysis than would be expected on television news 
programmes. We wished to analyse substantial discourses, not sound bites. 
Second, the News Letter is widely recognized as the region‟s leading unionist 
newspaper and would be likely to contain substantial information about the 
DUP. The News Letter is used by unionist politicians as a platform for their 
electoral bids and spreading their political positions. Indeed, DUP members 
frequently write letters to the editor and op-ed pieces. It also is interesting 
that the editorial tone of the News Letter changed between 1998 and 2006, 
synchronising its sympathies with whichever unionist party was in power. 
Finally, the letters to the editor allowed us insight into what the unionist 
community was thinking and feeling towards the DUP and political events. 
Although letters to the editor may be unrepresentative or impressionistic (as 
would be the comments of callers on phone-in radio programmes, or political 
chat websites such as Slugger O‟Toole) they provide interesting contextual 
information about some of the emotions and events that surrounded the 
articulation of the DUP‟s discourses.  
The data from the News Letter was gathered using the Lexus Nexus 
search engine and the newspaper‟s website. The keyword used for the search 
engine was “DUP.” Rankin carried out this aspect of the research, June-
December 2006. These articles, with dates ranging from January 1998-
December 2006, amounted to nearly 8,000. Ganiel read each article 
chronologically, identifying “codes” for themes which were relevant to the 
research questions about the wider project on the DUP. For the purpose of 
this paper, the codes which were relevant were “paramilitarism,” and 
“security and policing.”2 Re-reading the codes that corresponded with these 
broad themes, we identified the dominant DUP discourses about violence. 
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These will come as no surprise to followers of Northern Ireland politics, as 
they are discourses that have been prominent in the public sphere. When it 
came to republican violence, the party denounced violence by focusing on 
the immorality of “terrorists” (Sinn Féin) in government and the lack of 
decommissioning. When it came to loyalist violence, the DUP cast 
paramilitaries in the role of deviants who do not represent the unionist 
community, or as criminals. It should be stated, however, that there was a 
notable lack of discourses about loyalist paramilitaries. Whilst the IRA were 
denounced nearly every day, discourses about loyalist paramilitaries were 
infrequent and usually prompted by specific events, such as feuding amongst 
rival loyalist groups.  
It is worth recording some examples of these discourses, so that their 
strength and vigour can be adequately grasped. The emotive nature of these 
words provides some insight into why, historically, Paisley and the DUP 
have been accused of inciting others to violence. As Northern Ireland 
continues its political transition, it is important to record, highlight and 
consider its occasionally harsh public discourses. This raises broader 
questions (which are beyond the scope of this article) about the role that such 
discourses play in political transitions, especially as parties and citizens 
adjust to new power relationships and political configurations. It also raises 
questions about why political parties continue to use such discourses. For 
instance, did the DUP continue to talk in such terms as a matter of principle, 
or because it was a strategy to overtake the UUP, or both? Or were there 
other reasons? Because of the nature of the data analysed in this article, we 
can only raise such questions, not answer them definitively. As such, the 
bulk of the following sections of this article are largely descriptive, and 
should be seen as part of a preliminary process of “making sense” of 
discourses about violence in post-conflict transitions.  
 
The Immorality of the Inclusion of Sinn Fein  
 
The DUP‟s criticisms of Sinn Féin and the IRA are not new. The 
party‟s discourses about “terrorists in government” are in continuation with 
what the party said for decades during the Troubles. This is an example from 
an article from 1998, shortly after the Belfast Agreement was approved in a 
referendum. The DUP, despite having opposed the agreement, decided to 
participate in the Assembly:  
  
DUP Discourses on Violence  
 
Peace and Conflict Studies • Volume 15, Number 1 
- 120 - 
 
[Paisley said]: “I‟m thinking of those that were maimed by his [Gerry 
Adams] cohorts. The families that were torn apart, the people that were 
smashed and turned into vegetables by IRA violence.”  
Sinn Féin‟s Martin McGuinness stared straight at Mr. Paisley and 
accused him of running away. “You refused to come into negotiations 
but you come trundling into this room now because you are afraid you 
are going to be left behind. But I‟m afraid you‟ve already been left 
behind.” 
Peter Robinson shouted back at Mr. McGuinness, making loud 
reference to “your Semtex and Armalites” (News Letter, 2 July 1998)  
Here, Paisley‟s comments about “vegetables” and Robinson‟s about 
“Semtex and Armalites” clearly identify Sinn Féin with the IRA. The fact 
that Robinson is described as shouting adds to the emotion of the words. In 
the following narrative, from before the agreement negotiations were 
completed, Robinson focuses on the immorality of even talking with Sinn 
Féin because of their association with the IRA. He argues that it is corrupt 
and obscene to even allow them to negotiate: 
The [DUP] said the public was appalled at the “political corruption” 
and have no confidence in unionists who are attending the talks. … 
Deputy leader Peter Robinson said, “the responsibility for the 
corruption lies with the government and those parties that support the 
obscenity of trading with terrorists. … The Official Unionist3 
leadership complain that Sinn Féin/IRA are active and involved in 
terrorist incidents yet it was the Official Unionist leadership that agreed 
to let them in without handing over their weapons and it is they who sit 
around the negotiating table with Adams, McGuinness and company in 
a few weeks if the Provos
4
 decide to return.” (News Letter, 24 February 
1998) 
Discourses such as this allowed the DUP to present the inclusion of 
Sinn Féin in talks and later in the Assembly as undemocratic and morally 
wrong. Indeed, the religiously devout amongst Paisley‟s followers might 
even interpret these discourses to mean that sharing government with Sinn 
Féin would be against God‟s will. Such discourses played well in a Northern 
Ireland in which Protestants increasingly believed that Catholics had 
benefited from the agreement, whilst Protestants had not (Mitchell, 2006, p. 
32-33). This raises questions about whether people speaking for the DUP 
truly believed that it was immoral to include Sinn Féin in government, or 
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whether they saw an electoral advantage in criticising the UUP for 
compromising with Sinn Féin, or both.  
 
The Lack of Decommissioning   
 
When the IRA failed to decommission within two years of the Belfast 
Agreement (as had been suggested, though not required, in the negotiations 
and agreement), the DUP accused the UUP of being soft of terrorism. The 
DUP framed its discourses about decommissioning as a matter of trust: Sinn 
Féin and the IRA could not be trusted because the IRA had not verifiably 
decommissioned and the UUP could not be trusted because they had not 
negotiated a deal that required decommissioning. The UUP was presented as 
giving concession after concession to the IRA, with the IRA using its hidden 
caches of guns as leverage in negotiations. Even when the Independent 
Monitoring Commission (IMC) confirmed that the IRA had completed acts 
of decommissioning on several occasions, the DUP questioned the 
trustworthiness of those statements.  
For example, the IRA announced an act of decommissioning in 
October 2003 and this was verified by retired Canadian general John de 
Chastalain. However, when de Chastalain‟s press conference did not provide 
substantial or, in particular, photographic detail of what he actually 
witnessed, the DUP immediately cast doubt on what had happened and 
criticised the UUP and the IRA. The comments made by Paisley in reaction 
to this press conference epitomise this discourse:  
 “The IRA has made the UUP look ridiculous with this pathetic effort. 
… What on earth was David Trimble talking to Gerry Adams about? 
This is a demonstration of the most inept form of negotiation by the 
UUP imaginable. They are utterly unfit to represent unionism. Today 
indicated that nothing has changed in the IRA. Once again they are 
willing to milk the process for all they can get and make only weasel 
words and a hidden gesture. There is no evidence whatsoever of any 
reduction in the IRA capacity. This is yet another con.” Mr. Paisley 
said the language used by Gerry Adams and the IRA failed to state that 
the war is over or the IRA would disband. (News Letter, 22 October 
2003) 
Further on in this same report, Paisley criticises the “language used by 
Gerry Adams and the IRA” (note again the direct connection made between 
Sinn Féin and terrorism) for failing to explicitly state that “the war is over”. 
This is a neat reflection of the fact that opposing parties have been acutely 
aware of each other‟s discourse throughout the conflict and peace process. 
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As mentioned above, the question of decommissioning became a 
crucial issue of debate and competition within unionism. The DUP‟s refusal 
to accept the IMC‟s word on IRA decommissioning was not just a source of 
objection to the power-sharing Executive and Sinn Féin‟s position in it; it 
was also a strong point of contention with (and a good means of attracting 
votes away from) the UUP. Paisley questioned the trustworthiness and the 
competence of the UUP in this speech to launch the 2003 Assembly election 
campaign. Once again he claimed that concessions had been delivered to the 
IRA, and played on unionist concerns about all-Ireland structures and the 
possibility that Sinn Féin‟s Gerry Kelly (a former IRA prisoner) could be 
Minister for Policing and Justice: 
This election offers a simple choice. Four more years of Trimble-
delivered concessions to Sinn Féin/IRA or the opportunity to 
negotiate a new and fair deal that unionists as well as nationalists can 
support. This election is an opportunity to deliver a verdict on what 
Trimble and the “Official Unionists” have done over the past five 
years. They signed up to a deal, which has delivered concessions to 
the IRA, not just on one day in 1998, but for every day since. The 
pain and betrayal felt by unionists at the Belfast Agreement has not 
passed with time but has intensified as the terrorists have made a 
mockery of the democratic system. The unionist community stands at 
a crossroads. One path leads to implementing the current 
Trimble/Adams deal, which will deliver permanent terrorist 
representation in government, galvanising the embryonic all-Ireland 
structures with Sinn Féin consent required for major political 
decisions and Gerry Kelly as minister for Policing and Justice. The 
other road is a new deal, a democratic deal. (News Letter, 23 October 
2003) 
The DUP‟s discourses about the IRA‟s lack of decommissioning 
changed over time. When the IRA began with acts of decommissioning, 
witnessed first by de Chastalain and later by the IMC, the DUP questioned 
the integrity of the witnesses and the lack of detail in their reports. During 
negotiations to restore the Assembly in December 2004, the DUP demanded 
photographic evidence of decommissioning, which was rejected by Sinn Féin 
as an attempt to humiliate the IRA. Any hopes that a deal could be salvaged 
were put on hold days later after the Northern Bank robbery in Belfast, 
which is believed to have been carried out by the IRA. The DUP also talked 
about Sinn Féin needing a “decontamination period” after decommissioning, 
to allow them to become “fit” for democratic government. When Methodist 
minister Harold Good and Catholic priest Fr Alec Reid were invited to 
DUP Discourses on Violence  
 
Peace and Conflict Studies • Volume 15, Number 1 
- 123 - 
 
witness decommissioning, the DUP even doubted their testimonies, 
considering them naïve. However, by the time of the negotiations in October 
2006 in St Andrews, the DUP seemed to equate Sinn Féin‟s willingness to 
sign up to the Policing Board as “proof” of the IRA‟s decommissioning. This 
is how Paisley explained his decision to go into government with Sinn Féin 
in May 2007: 
“In politics as in life, it is a truism that no one can ever have 100% of 
what they desire. They must make a verdict when they believe they 
have achieved enough to move things forward.” The DUP leader said 
Sinn Féin‟s acceptance of the rule of law at its ard fheis [annual 
convention] three months ago had met that test. “Support for all the 
institutions of policing has been a critical test that today has been met 
and pledged, word and deed. … Recognising the significance of that 
change from a community that for decades demonstrated hostility for 
policing has been critical in turning the corner.” (News Letter, 9 May 
2007)  
After years of denouncing claims of IRA decommissioning as 
inadequate, this is, undoubtedly, a significant change. But questions remain 
about whether unionists accept the DUP‟s explanations for its decisions. In 
the quotation above, Paisley equated Sinn Féin‟s recognition of the police 
with IRA decommissioning, allowing the party to claim that it had succeeded 
where the UUP failed. It is not clear whether this is enough to satisfy all of 
Paisley‟s followers. The DUP has made little attempt to articulate sustained 
practical, moral or theological discourses to justify sharing power with Sinn 
Féin.   
 
Denying: Loyalist Paramilitaries as Deviants and Criminals 
 
Far fewer of the DUP‟s discourses engaged directly with loyalist 
paramilitarism. Those that did were usually in response to direct accusations 
about DUP links to violence; or particular events such as loyalist feuds. The 
lack of discourses about loyalist violence as compared to the almost constant 
discourses denouncing the IRA is worth considering. The DUP developed 
discourses about the rising crime rate, blaming it on the implementation of 
the Belfast Agreement – particularly the scaling down of the police and 
army. However, noticeably absent from those discourses was any recognition 
that an increasing proportion of crime and violence was now carried out by 
loyalist – not republican – paramilitary groups. 
The following response by Minister of the Legislative Assembly 
(MLA) Jeffrey Donaldson, a former UUP MP who defected to the DUP in 
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opposition to the 1998 Agreement, appeared on the Letters page. He was 
responding to comments made by the UUP‟s Dermot Nesbitt, who tried to 
equate the DUP with the IRA and accused Donaldson of socialising with 
Martin McGuinness:  
Dermot‟s case is based on his assertion that, at one point, he observed I 
was standing near a table where Martin McGuinness was seated with 
others, a kind of “proximity socialising”.  
I did not speak with Martin McGuinness in the reception and, when I 
challenged Dermot on this point in a BBC Talkback interview, he 
withdrew his allegation that I was socialising with Mr McGuinness. 
… In the Donegal debate, whilst I concentrated on exposing republican 
failure to end their terrorist activities, Mr Nesbitt continuously attacked 
the DUP and at one point, rather pathetically, sought to equate the DUP 
with the IRA. To borrow a phrase, it was rather like being savaged by a 
“dead sheep”. It is becoming absolutely clear that, having lost the 
support and trust of the unionist community, people like Dermot seem 
determined to prevent the DUP from delivering a fair deal for unionism 
as it would only expose his past failings. After all, it was Dermot who 
promised South Down unionists that he would not sit in government 
with any party with “guns under the table, on the table or outside the 
door”. He broke his word and became a government minister alongside 
Martin McGuinness and Bairbre de Brun without a single IRA bullet 
being decommissioned. (News Letter, 6 August. 2004) 
Donaldson denies and dismisses Nesbitt‟s accusations about DUP links 
with violence by equating them (quoting from the famous put-down by a 
British Labour Party MP of his Conservative counterpart in Westminster) to 
“being savaged by a dead sheep.” He then goes on to draw his argument back 
to an accusation against the UUP, once again blaming the UUP for the IRA‟s 
lack of decommissioning.  
On occasion, the DUP has condemned loyalist paramilitaries. In this 
example from August 2005, during a feud between the Loyalist Volunteer 
Force and the Ulster Volunteer Force, the DUP MLA, Edwin Poots, 
describes loyalist paramilitaries as criminals who were oppressing their own 
people:  
Loyalist paramilitaries claim to exist because of the republican threat 
against their community, but the reality is that people in the loyalist 
community are living in fear not from their traditional enemy but from 
people within their own community. The ongoing feud within elements 
of loyalism is causing huge damage and demoralising the unionist 
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community. For decades republicans have attacked and killed 
thousands of Protestants, but today there is a clear reality that 
Protestants could be attacked by so-called loyalists as well as 
republicans. The murder of four Protestants, by these so-called 
loyalists, has caused dismay and has totally demoralised the Protestant 
community. 
Poots goes on to say that loyalist paramilitaries were now doing the 
work of the IRA by unleashing misery on their communities:  
Why does the IRA need to continue their campaign of terrorism when 
so-called loyalists will do the job for them? ... The current campaign is 
not about defending Ulster. It has more to do with protection money, 
extortion and drug dealing. While the IRA are using their guns to 
squeeze concession after concession out of the British government, 
loyalists have turned their guns on themselves and have turned to 
criminality, extortion and drug dealing. As a public representative I 
appeal to these so-called loyalists who are oppressing the Protestant 
community to get off the backs of your own people. Instead, get 
involved in restoring normality to deprived Protestant areas and divert 
your energy to setting up programmes that will provide a better future 
for your children. (News Letter, 24 August 2005) 
Paisley responded in a similar way to loyalist attacks on Catholic 
property in his constituency: 
“My view on the attacks is a simple one. ... There are people in 
Ballymena who know who are doing this and they should be supporting 
the police and getting the PSNI on the job of bringing these people to 
order. These attacks have been universally condemned by all law 
abiding people in Ballymena.” Mr Paisley claimed there had also been 
a series of attacks on Evangelical and Protestant churches in the 
Province and said a window was smashed at his own church in recent 
days. He added: “On both sides there is this cancer and the only way it 
can be fought is by the people who know who is responsible. There are 
people in Ballymena who know who those people are. They don‟t come 
in the middle of the night and go away in the middle of the night. They 
are people living in the area. … They should desist at once. They have 
no place in the community whatsoever. If they think they can speak for 
the people of Ballymena then they should stand for election and see 
what kind of response they get.” (News Letter, 31 August 2005) 
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Paisley uses characteristically strong words: “they have no place in the 
community whatsoever.” The earlier comments from Poots dismiss loyalist 
paramilitaries as criminals who are terrorising their own people, rather than 
“defending Ulster.” Over the years, the DUP have consistently denied the 
legitimacy of loyalist paramilitary violence – as well as the possible 
involvement of party members in it. This has allowed the DUP to present 
itself as a party with “clean hands”, democratic and morally fit to exercise 
power. However, there are those who contend that the DUP has not 
satisfactory explained its former links with paramilitaries (Brewer and 
Higgins, 1998; Mitchel, 2003; Moloney, 2008). Further, reducing loyalist 
paramilitaries to criminals and thugs may absolve the party and the unionist 
community from facing up to the role loyalist paramilitaries have played 
over the years.  
 
Identity and Discourses about Violence 
 
Since its inception in 1971, there have been two major strands in the 
DUP‟s identity: loyalism and evangelicalism. The loyalist strand emphasises 
the DUP‟s identity as a tough, straight-talking party tenaciously clinging to 
the link with Great Britain. It will not “sell out” at any cost, unlike the 
“softer” UUP. Until it overtook the UUP in the 2003 Assembly elections, 
this strand made the DUP appear as if it was on the edge – a party of protest 
that was the brash, vocal, “thought police” of unionism, as Jackson (1999) 
has put it. The evangelical strand emphasises the DUP‟s identity as righteous 
and morally trustworthy (Mitchel, 2003, p. 171-212; Bruce, 1986, 2007; 
Smyth, 1986). Free Presbyterians and other evangelicals remain over-
represented in the ranks of party representatives (Mitchell, 2008a; Bruce, 
2007; Ganiel, 2006; Southern 2005).  
The appeal to the party‟s evangelical identity can be seen below in the 
way Paisley draws on Biblical themes to denounce the immorality of Sinn 
Féin and unionists who did business with them. The colourful language 
about weapons and genocide, and the venue at which it was spoken, an 
Independent Orange Order
5 
demonstration in Portglenone in 2001, appeals to 
the party‟s loyalist identity: 
To vote for taking into the Executive of Northern Ireland the Roman 
Catholic IRA/Sinn Féin with all their weaponry carefully preserved for 
the genocide of the next Protestant generation, is an act of darkest 
treason. Yet, Orangemen in the Assembly cheered after they had 
defeated their brother-Orangemen and fellow Protestants by joining 
ranks with the political representatives of the IRA murderers, thus 
DUP Discourses on Violence  
 
Peace and Conflict Studies • Volume 15, Number 1 
- 127 - 
 
succeeding in that Iscariot treachery. Today, those same Orangemen, 
besashed, will sport themselves as defenders of the Faith and 
maintainers of the Union. A return to the basic principles of Orangeism 
is imperative. (News Letter, 13 July 2001) 
As in Paisley‟s address above, discourses about the immorality of 
terrorists in government often included religious overtones, including the 
idea that the IRA should not only decommission their weapons, but that they 
should “repent” before Sinn Féin should be allowed to participate in 
government. Perhaps the most famous of these was Paisley‟s 2004 
“sackcloth and ashes” speech to party supporters in Ballymena. Here is an 
example from an article describing criticism of the speech: 
Ian Paisley yesterday brushed aside the “delicate” nature of the peace 
talks, when he reminded republicans that they were not the only ones 
who had suffered throughout the Troubles. 
The DUP leader decided to ditch the diplomatic approach and 
expressed his inner feelings, when he told reporters in Downing Street 
that he stuck by comments he had made last weekend to party members 
– that the IRA should be humiliated and made “to wear sackcloth and 
ashes” for their crimes. 
… “There is no excuse for what they (the IRA) did,‟ the DUP leader 
said. „Every day the security forces have to wear sackcloth and ashes 
… They have to do that – that is all right for the security forces 
(according to republicans). But as for us, we are immune to it – that is 
their (republicans) attitude.” (News Letter, 1 December 2004)  
Discourses such as these have allowed the DUP to present itself as 
remaining true to both the evangelical and loyalist strands of its identity.  
 
Relationship between Discourses and Electoral Success 
 
It is important that the DUP seems to remain true to its identity. This 
allows the party to present itself as vigilant and trustworthy, at the same time 
providing security as it makes changes that – on the surface – do not reflect 
its traditional loyalist and evangelical identities (Ganiel and Dixon, 2008; 
Ganiel, 2007). For instance, even before it agreed to share the Assembly 
Executive with Sinn Féin in 2007, the DUP had committed itself to power 
sharing and had worked with Sinn Féin at other levels of government. 
Beyond its tough discourses about violence, the party utilised other 
narratives to accomplish this. For example, the party has consistently 
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claimed it opposes the Belfast Agreement. So first, it justified its 
participation in institutions set up by the agreement on the grounds that they 
would destroy the agreement. Then, they justified their participation by 
saying that if they were the largest party, they would “re-negotiate” the 
agreement and get a new, “fair deal” for unionism. Now, by referring to the 
points agreed during negotiations at St Andrews in 2006 as “the St Andrews 
Agreement”, the DUP can claim that it has done just what it said (Ganiel, 
2007).  
Such discursive tricks have allowed the DUP to retain its appeal to 
traditional loyalists and evangelicals and to tap into widespread Protestant 
dissatisfaction with the Belfast Agreement. At the same time, the gradual 
shift of their policies in a more UUP-like direction has attracted moderate 
unionist voters. Tough discourses about violence and the agreement have 
provided a smokescreen for significant policy changes. These have been 
accompanied by discourses that contrast the DUP‟s tough stance with that of 
the supposedly weak UUP. This can be seen in the following narrative from 
MLA Norah Beare, who criticised the UUP‟s willingness to sit in 
government with former paramilitaries. This statement is from June 2006, 
just a few months before the St Andrews deal: 
I fail to see how any unionist worth his salt could issue a statement on 
restoring devolved government but make no mention of the obstacle 
created by paramilitary and criminal activity … I speak to many people 
and I know that they share my party‟s desire to get down to sorting out 
the bread and butter issues for ourselves […] but they also want us to 
make sure we get the basics right so we have a government which is 
truly democratic. 
They do not want to go back to the old Ulster Unionist tactics of 
bowing the knee to republicans, entering a government prematurely, 
discovering republicans have still not delivered and then being forced 
to go back to square one and being no better off. (Beare, 20 June 2006) 
Of course, words alone do not explain the DUP‟s electoral success. The 
DUP has a much stronger grassroots presence than the UUP, and individual 
ministers are often regarded as hard-working on bread and butter issues. The 
UUP has had its own internal problems, including bitter divisions that often 
left the party paralysed. And the IRA itself might even be considered a key 
player in the DUP‟s electoral success, as its ambiguity about 
decommissioning played into the party‟s hands (Moloney, 2008; Bruce, 
2007; Farrington, 2006).  
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That said, the question remains whether the words that have helped 
propel the DUP to electoral success will come back to haunt them now that 
they must exercise power. At a basic level, traditional loyalists and 
evangelicals may feel betrayed by images of Paisley and McGuinness in cosy 
collaboration. It is possible that the DUP could lose those voters. In 
December 2007 a group calling itself Traditional Unionist Voice (TUV) was 
launched. This grouping, which claims branches in 12 of the 18 
constituencies in Northern Ireland, initially described itself as a movement, 
not a party, and is led by former DUP member and current MEP Jim Allister. 
Allister resigned from the DUP in protest after its decision to sit in 
government with Sinn Féin. In his statement announcing the launch of TUV, 
Allister (2007) said: “TUV will occupy the traditional unionist ground so 
wantonly abandoned by others for the sake of office.” TUV contested a by-
election in Dromore in 2008, splitting the unionist vote and paving the way 
for a UUP victory. Allister remains the most visible and vocal public critic of 
changes in DUP policy. Similarly, a group calling itself Concerned Free 
Presbyterians was established after Paisley entered government with Sinn 
Féin. They claimed that Paisley‟s decision had compromised his Christian 
witness, and eventually Paisley agreed not to put himself forward for re-
election as Moderator of the Free Presbyterian Church – a position he had 
held since its inception.
6
 Further, the Grand Chaplain of the Orange Order 
and a prominent evangelical within the Presbyterian Church in Ireland, Rev. 
Stephen Dickinson, issued a statement in support of TUV (Dickinson 2007). 
The next part of the paper considers in more detail how the DUP‟s discourses 
about violence may impact on the political transition.  
 
Discourses about Violence and Political Transition 
 
With the DUP and Sinn Féin now sharing power in the Assembly, it 
may be tempting to look at the DUP‟s discourses about violence and ask, “so 
what?” The past is the past, words are only words, and now it is time to 
move on. But to do so would be to fail to raise wider questions about issues 
that it may be necessary to address in post-conflict, transitional societies, 
such as relationship-building, truth recovery and reconciliation, and re-
integrating ex-combatants into society. It also is not certain if the DUP 
needs, or has, alternative discourses to replace their previous discourses 
about violence.  
First, it is not clear how the DUP‟s harsh words about Sinn Féin and 
the illegitimacy of the IRA will affect their relationships in the Executive. 
Many of the DUP‟s discourses about IRA violence conveyed a lack of trust. 
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Could the IRA be trusted to stop killing people? Could people associated 
with the IRA be trusted to govern democratically? Does Sinn Féin need a 
“decontamination period”? These discourses not only reflect a lack of trust 
by members of the DUP, but also reflect attitudes that are present at the 
unionist grassroots. The DUP and Sinn Féin are now sharing government, 
but it is unlikely that trust has developed overnight. Further research on 
political parties in Northern Ireland might concentrate on how trust was built 
between these parties to the extent that they agreed to enter into government. 
It also is worth considering further steps that might be taken to build trust. 
The DUP‟s emotive discourses about IRA violence should also serve to 
remind us that people at the grassroots – especially unionists who have lost 
loved ones to IRA violence – may still not trust Sinn Féin or the IRA. 
Accordingly, grassroots confidence building measures should be considered.    
Second, it is not clear that the DUP has convincing discourses to 
explain to its constituencies its change in direction. Thus far, the party has 
justified its decision to share power in the Executive by appealing to 
“democratic” principles and claiming that Sinn Féin‟s recognition of the 
police can be equated to making the IRA “go away.” This can be seen in the 
following narrative from MLA Mervyn Storey, from June 2006. In advance 
of the St Andrews negotiations, Storey was explaining what it would take for 
the DUP to share power with Sinn Féin: 
as desirable as devolution is, it must be rebuilt upon solid foundations. 
Previous attempts to establish devolution in the Province have failed. 
Why? Because basic fundamentals like a solid, unshakable democratic 
footing and accountability were missing … [no other democratic 
country in the world] would tolerate the presence of the associates of 
unreconstructed terrorists and gangsters within their government. 
The simple and straightforward standard that all those wishing to wield 
power within a devolved administration in Northern Ireland should be 
demonstrably committed to solely peaceful and democratic methods is 
not one made up by the Democratic Unionist Party. It is universal … 
We know where we want to get to – democratic devolution. There is 
now nothing left to negotiate. Parties either sign up to the basic 
standards of democracy and abide by them or there can be no place in 
any Executive for them. (News Letter, 8 June 2006) 
 A second way that Paisley and his wife have used to justify the 
DUP‟s decision is to appeal to Paisley‟s authority as a man of God. This 
discourse has not been dominant in the secular public sphere of newspapers 
and other media, but has surfaced in the Free Presbyterian magazine the 
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Revivalist. Moloney (2008, p. 502-503) cites an editorial in the May 2007 
issue of the magazine which claims that Paisley “was God‟s „specially 
anointed‟ leader,” and drew on that authority in his political decisions. In her 
column in the same issue, Paisley‟s wife Eileen wrote: “Like the Israelites of 
old treated Moses so they treat today‟s God-anointed leader. They refuse to 
believe that God is already working in the most unexpected places and in the 
hearts of the most unexpected people. Again, like the Israelites, they prefer to 
remain in the wilderness of the past than move into the promised land of a 
better and happier future” (quoted in Moloney, 2008, p. 503).  
That said, it is not certain that either of these discourses have won the 
hearts and minds of dissatisfied unionists. Indeed, there have been rumblings 
from the unionist grassroots that people were disappointed that Paisley and 
McGuinness seemed to be enjoying each other‟s company so much as they 
acted out their duties as First Minister and Deputy First Minister. The 
existence of TUV and Concerned Free Presbyterians indicate that the DUP‟s 
discourses have not been entirely effective. Further research on TUV and 
Concerned Free Presbyterians could attempt to gauge the depth and breadth 
of unionist opposition to DUP-Sinn Féin power-sharing. 
Third, the DUP‟s denial about its relationship with loyalist 
paramilitaries could have implications for truth recovery and reconciliation. 
Most of the biographies of Paisley or analyses of the DUP from the 1980s 
and 1990s consider the question of the party‟s relationship with loyalist 
violence (Bruce, 1986, 2007; Moloney and Pollak, 1986; Smyth, 1987; 
Cooke, 1996; Moloney, 2008). All acknowledge at least some links, although 
Bruce (1986, 2001) downplays them. Bruce‟s (2007) later work on Paisley is 
even more strident in its defence of Paisley‟s non-violent credentials. But 
Moloney (2008), Brewer and Higgins (1998) and Mitchel (2003) claim that, 
at the very least, Paisley‟s anti-Catholic rhetoric stirred some paramilitaries 
to violence. More recently, O‟Callaghan and O‟Donnell‟s (2006) analysis of 
materials from the Public Records Office, Northern Ireland, demonstrates 
that in the mid-60s, the Royal Ulster Constabulary‟s Inspector General 
believed that what was called in the documents the “Paisleyite Movement” 
consisted of the following groups: the Ulster Constitution Defence 
Committee, the Ulster Protestant Volunteer Division, the Ulster Volunteer 
Force, the Ulster Defence Corps, the Ulster Protestant Action Defence 
Committee and the Ulster Volunteer Force. O‟Callaghan and O‟Donnell 
argue that the information in these documents contributed to the decision to 
ban the UVF at the end of 1966. Although this predates the formation of the 
DUP, Paisley‟s very personal involvement with these groups bears 
consideration. It is likely that many nationalists do not believe the denials of 
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Paisley and the DUP about their involvement with or responsibility for 
loyalist violence. Therefore, it is worth asking to what extent should public 
knowledge about Paisley and the DUP‟s relationship with violent groups be 
part of a “truth recovery” process in Northern Ireland? Of course, this should 
be set in the context of the violence of republican and loyalist paramilitary 
groups and the security forces. At this stage, it is not clear what shape 
Northern Ireland‟s truth recovery process will take, so it is also worth 
considering how a lack of truth recovery may impact on the potential 
reconciliation of people from groups with violent histories – including Sinn 
Féin and the DUP.  
Fourth, the DUP‟s denial of involvement with paramilitaries, coupled 
with their harsh condemnation of their current activities, raises questions 
about the integration of ex-combatants into society (See also Mitchell, 
2008b). DUP discourses about loyalist paramilitaries have tended to cast 
them as people who are outside of the pale, not worthy of inclusion in the 
community. (Occasionally, loyalist paramilitaries are deemed worthy to re-
enter the unionist fold if they become Christians by being “born again” or 
“saved.”) These discourses may reflect a wider unionist attitude about 
violence, which focuses blame on a select few. This absolves the rest of the 
community from responsibility for violence, brushing over ambiguities about 
turning a blind eye to tacit support for violence, including not only terrorist 
atrocities and punishment beatings, but the violence associated with some 
Orange parades. In such a situation, the challenges of integrating former 
loyalist paramilitaries in society may not be adequately addressed. For 
instance, it is not clear if or to what extent this item is even on the DUP‟s 
agenda.  
The material presented in this paper should be seen as part of a 
preliminary process of documenting hardline discourses about violence 
during Northern Ireland‟s peace process. It aims to raise questions about the 
appropriateness of such discourses as Northern Ireland transitions from 
physical violence to peace. It has demonstrated that the DUP has used 
discourses about violence to secure its own identity as a party and to 
overtake the UUP in electoral terms. But using discourses about violence in 
these ways means that the party now faces challenges in working political 
institutions with people it has spent years denouncing – and in justifying this 
change to its supporters. The party also faces challenges in coming to terms 
with violence in its own past and that of the unionist community. This serves 
as reminder that even as power-sharing is implemented, issues and attitudes 
around violence remain unresolved and unaddressed. Such ambivalence 
about violence is common in transitional societies. This ambivalence may 
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hinder the progress of peace building. With that in mind, political parties and 
other policy makers would do well to consider the public impact of 
continued violent discourses.   
 
Endnotes 
 
* We are grateful to Katy Hayward and Catherine O‟Donnell for their 
organisation of the Peace Lines conference in Dublin in June 2007, and for 
the helpful comments of those who participated.  
 
1
 It is worth initially clarifying the terms “unionism” and “loyalism.” 
Unionism is an umbrella term for the population of people in Northern 
Ireland who favour retaining the union with Great Britain. The 
overwhelming majority identify with the Protestant religious tradition. 
“Loyalism” generally refers to a population of unionists who are considered 
more “extreme” or “hardline” about their loyalty to Great Britain. See Todd 
(1987) for a fuller explanation. 
2
 Other codes included: peace process, the surrender process, the 
delegitimatisation of Trimble and the UUP, morality, the security threat, 
victimisation, renegotiation, the Assembly, cross community relations, 
cultural issues, Jeffrey Donaldson (related to his transfer from the UUP), 
education, Europe, funding, gender, local politics, moral issues, “no” 
campaign, non-involvement in talks, North/ South dimension, parading, 
party growth, party member activity, power-sharing, protest, religion and 
politics, social/economic issues, unionist disunity, and US involvement. The 
coded data is stored at the Belfast campus of the Irish School of Ecumenics, 
Trinity College Dublin. 
3 “Official Unionist” is another name for the Ulster Unionist Party. 
4
 “Provos” is short for the “Provisional IRA.”  
5
 The Independent Orange Order is a fraternal organisation for Protestants. It 
is smaller than the main Orange Order, from which it separated near the 
beginning of the last century. Both groups are exclusively Protestant and 
their main activity is organising parades throughout the summer months. The 
largest parades are on the 12
th
 of July and commemorate the victory of the 
Protestant King William of Orange over a Catholic force at the Battle of the 
Boyne in 1690. These parades are often contentious, especially if they pass 
through predominantly Catholic areas.  
6 
The Concerned Free Presbyterians group had an interactive website which 
disseminated their criticisms of Paisley and the DUP. But after Paisley‟s 
decision to step down in September 2007, the content of the site was taken 
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down. Now the visitors are greeted with the message: “This website has now 
been „put beyond use‟.” <http://www.concernedfreepresbyterians.com> 
(December 2007). We downloaded and saved electronically a substantial 
portion of the postings on the website before they were removed.  
 
References 
 
Allister, J. “Statement by Jim Allister MEP Announcing the Launch of new 
Political Movement.” Brussels Briefing. December 2007, available at: 
<http://www.jimallister.org> (August 2008).  
Brewer, J. and Higgins, G. The Mote and the Beam: Anti-Catholicism in 
Northern Ireland, 1600–1998. Basingstoke: Macmillan Press, 1998.  
Bruce, S. Paisley: Religion and Politics in Northern Ireland. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2007. 
Bruce, S. “Fundamentalism and Political Violence: the case of Paisley and 
Ulster Evangelicals.” Religion, 2001, (31) 387–405. 
Bruce, S. God Save Ulster! The Religion and Politics of Paisleyism. Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1986. 
Cooke, D. Persecuting Zeal: A Portrait of Ian Paisley. Dingle: Brandon, 
1996. 
Dickinson, S. “Statement of Support by the Grand Chaplain of the Orange 
Order, Rev. Stephen Dickinson.” Brussels Briefing. December 2007. 
available at: <http://www.jimallister.org> (August 2008). 
Farrington, C. Ulster Unionism and the Peace Process in Northern Ireland. 
Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006. 
Ganiel, G. and Dixon, P. “Religion, Pragmatic Fundamentalism and the 
Transformation of the Northern Ireland Conflict, 2008, Journal of Peace 
Studies, 45(3) 419–436.  
Ganiel, G. “Preaching to the Choir? An Analysis of DUP Discourses About 
the Northern Ireland Peace Process.” Irish Political Studies, 2007, 22(3) 
303–320. 
Ganiel, G. “ Ulster Says Maybe: The Restructuring of Evangelical Politics in 
Northern Ireland.” Irish Political Studies, 2006, 21(2) 137–155. 
Jackson, A. Ireland, 1798–1998: Politics and War. Oxford: Blackwell, 1999.  
Mitchell, C. “Commentary.” In C. McGrath and E. O‟Malley (eds.), Irish 
Political Studies Reader: Key Contributions. Oxon: Routledge, 2008a. 
Mitchell, C. “The Limits of Legitimacy: Former Loyalist Combatants and 
Peace-Building in Northern Ireland,” Irish Political Studies, 2008b, 23(1) 1–
19. 
DUP Discourses on Violence  
 
Peace and Conflict Studies • Volume 15, Number 1 
- 135 - 
 
Mitchell, C. Religion, Identity and Politics in Northern Ireland: Boundaries 
of Belonging and Belief. Aldershot: Ashgate, 2006.   
Mitchel, P. Evangelicalism and National Identity in Ulster, 1921–1998. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003. 
Moloney, E. Paisley: From Demagogue to Democrat? Dublin: Poolbeg, 
2008.  
Moloney, E. and Pollak, A. Paisley. Swords: Poolbeg, 1986. 
O‟Callaghan, M. and O‟Donnell, C. “The Northern Ireland Government, the 
„Paisleyite Movement‟ and Ulster Unionism in 1966.” Irish Political Studies, 
2006, 21(2) 203–222. 
Smyth, C. Ian Paisley: Voice of Protestant Ulster. Edinburgh: Scottish 
Academic Press, 1987. 
Smyth, C. “The DUP as a Politico-religious Organisation.” Irish Political 
Studies, 1986, (1) 33–43. 
Southern, N. “Ian Paisley and Evangelical Democratic Unionists: an analysis 
of the role of evangelical Protestantism within the Democratic Unionist 
Party.” Irish Political Studies, 2005, 20(2) 127–145 
Todd, J. “Two Traditions in Unionist Political Culture,” Irish Political 
Studies, 1987, (2) 1–26. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
